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Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko’s regime 
Kamil Kłysiński, co-operation Tadeusz Iwański
Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the 
economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven 
increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situa-
tion, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis 
and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regu-
lations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances 
of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting 
fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the 
least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased 
costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope 
of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. 
Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing 
substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement 
and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in 
the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hin-
dering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore 
feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating 
position ever weaker. 
The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to 
maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the ma-
jority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe 
crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current 
threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging 
the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term. 
Short-term anti-crisis measures instead of a strategy for reforms 
Increasing economic problems, such as the deficit of foreign currencies, a dynamic surge in 
the inflation rate and growing external debts have forced the Belarusian government to take 
anti-crisis measures which are however short-term, not systemi. Such actions include the 
introduction of an additional session on the stock exchange where the real ruble exchange 
rate, adequate to the situation on the market, was to be set. In consequence, people and 
companies who bought Russian rubles on the black market were able to buy the currency 
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legally for the first time in many months. However, the government controlled the supply 
and demand through exerting pressure on banks and companies (the main participants in-
volved in stock exchange currency transactions). The government also lowered the amount 
of daily transactions and thus impacted on the ruble exchange rate. The exchange rate was 
brought down close to the artificially reduced (by approximately 50-60%) official exchange 
rate which was still in force and which was being used to regulate payments for Russian 
gas. In mid-October the situation spiralled out of control and the Belarusian government 
was forced to introduce a uniform Russian ruble exchange rate on 20 October, based on 
market mechanisms. This means a second devaluation this year of the Belarusian ruble of 
over 50%. However, it seems that the leadership will make further attempts to control the 
situation on the currency market as they issued a presidential decree which from November 
this year introduces an obligation to present an identity card at the exchange offices. 
This all points to the fact that the central bank does not have a coherent and consistent 
strategy for remedying the situation on the currency market and is making short-term deci-
sions limited in their impact due to the lack of sufficient reserves for currency interventions. 
According to the central bank’s data, the level of reserves on 1 October was US$ 4.7 billion, 
which is substantially below the safe level equivalent to the value of three months’ imports 
which for Belarus equates to US$ 12-15 billion. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that resources obtained from short-term currency loans from commercial banks consti-
tute approximately 70% of the reserves. 
An important threat to the stability of the Belarusian economy is posed by the accelerating infla-
tion rate which between January and mid-October this year reached over 80% and is forecast 
to exceed the threshold of 100% at the end of the year. Not only is the government unable 
to decelerate this process but is even intensifying it by raising salaries in the budget sector by 
28%, pensions by approximately 20% and by paying allowances to the poorest groups in soci-
ety. These moves are meant as a means of 
preventing the social backlash which Alex-
ander Lukashenko fears. However, from the 
economic point of view it is a very danger-
ous technique as it means increasing an al-
ready large issuance of the Belarusian ruble. 
During only the first nine months of 2011 
this increase was over 50%. 
Mounting external debts present another 
serious problem for Belarus. At the end of 
the first half of 2011 they amounted to ap-
proximately US$ 33 billion, which represents 56% of the country’s GDP and when calculated 
on the basis of the current ruble exchange rate it already exceeds 100%. The bulk of the debts 
is constituted by short-term loans and in 2012 the total amount of payments of these will reach 
US$ 4.9 billion. The negative trade balance which has been maintained for years leaves no 
chance to improve this situation. Furthermore, the first problems with paying for Russian gas are 
starting to appear and Belarus now owes approximately US$ 50 million to Gazprom. 
The awareness of the threat of collapse 
and the preservation of the economic model 
The Belarusian leadership are aware of the scale of the threat and are trying to obtain fur-
ther loans from the IMF – this time up to US$ 8 billion. Despite the positive assessment 
of Minsk’s measures on the currency market, the IMF is still sceptical of the Belarusian 
economic policy, particularly in the area of salaries and budget discipline. The situation is 
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An important threat is posed by 
the accelerating inflation rate, which 
is forecast to exceed the threshold 
of 100% at the end of the year. 
Not only is the government unable 
to decelerate this process 
but is even intensifying it by raising 
salaries and pensions. 
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exacerbated by Belarus’s dire state of relations with the EU and the US which are influential 
in the IMF. On the other hand, the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) controlled by 
Russia is also making further loans dependent on reforms, above all as regard privatisa-
tion. The EAEC has already lent Belarus US$ 800 million this year within the framework 
of the granted stabilisation loan worth US$ 3 billion. 
The Belarusian government is seeking to win support from countries outside Europe which 
do not make uncomfortable demands of political and economic reforms. However, despite 
huge possibilities they are interested only in providing loans for specific investment projects 
in Belarus, involving their own technologies and specialists. Countries such as Iran and 
Azerbaijan, which grant direct financial support, can offer only small loans falling substan-
tially short of Belarus’s needs. 
In spite of the enormous demand for foreign currency the restructuring of the ineffective 
and technologically outdated state-owned sector, which accounts for as much as 70% 
of the country’s GDP, is being blocked. 
On 7 October Alexander Lukashenko 
during a press conference for Russian 
journalists reiterated that privatisation 
in Belarus will have a limited scope and 
each transaction will be accompanied by 
a host of conditions regarding the level of 
employment and salaries. With regard to 
this an increased influx of external capital 
is therefore not to be expected. Between 
January and August this year the govern-
ment succeeded in obtaining slightly more 
than US$ 1 billion in foreign direct invest-
ments, which represents merely 18% of the amount planned for this year. Several days later 
Lukashenko said kolkhozy and sovkhozy, which he considered an ideal management model 
in the agricultural sector, will be preserved. Alexander Lukashenko thus made clear many 
times that he was not interested in reforming the Belarusian command-and-quota model.  
Repression and social allowances in internal affairs
In its internal affairs the regime is pursuing a policy of heightened control and repression to-
wards the opposition, independent civil society organisations and the media. The brutal mea-
sures undertaken by the regime’s forces against participants of the silent protests this summer 
revealed that the government does not intend to tolerate any manifestations of dissent. 
Furthermore, everything points to a further escalation of repression aimed at the regime’s 
opponents. In October this year the Belarusian parliament adopted a package of amend-
ments to the laws which regulate the functioning of civil society organisations, political 
parties and the principles of organising mass events. A series of amendments to the penal 
code and other legal acts were also passed. The changes which were introduced seriously 
intensify legal sanctions for receiving, storing and using foreign financial aid as well as for 
staging protests and public demonstrations. The amendments to the penal code consider-
ably extend the meaning of the terms: treason, undercover activity, and spying. This will 
facilitate accusations in these areas. At the same time a draft amendment to the law relat-
ing to the security agencies of the Republic of Belarus was submitted to parliament. If this 
amendment was passed, it would accord special competences to the KGB. KGB officials 
would have the right to enter any private flat or office of an organisation at any time and 
without a warrant. Moreover, the amended law would de facto exempt them from responsi-
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Despite an enormous demand for 
foreign currency the restructuring 
of the inefficient state-owned sec-
tor, which accounts for as much as 
70% of production, is being blocked. 
Alexander Lukashenko has many times 
made it clear that he is not interested 
in reforming the Belarusian command-
and-quota model. 
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bility for damage incurred during their operations and allow them to use arms, for example 
in reaction to assault on public facilities. 
The changes which are being introduced or proposed hit above all opposition parties and 
civil society organisations, including those which represent religious or national minorities, 
such as the Union of Poles in Belarus. The government is thus aiming to intimidate and 
paralyse the social groups which are most active and critical of the regime.  
By restricting the activity of the opposition and the third sector the government is respond-
ing to a radical decline in the confidence which society has in Alexander Lukashenko. 
According to an opinion poll conducted by an independent sociology centre IISEPS in Sep-
tember this year, over 60% of those surveyed blame the president for the current economic 
crisis. Support for Lukashenko fell by 
20.5%, which has been the lowest score 
recorded throughout his 17 year rule. 
Therefore, despite the visible weakness of 
the Belarusian opposition the regime fears 
a potential social backlash triggered by 
the deteriorating standard of living, par-
ticularly in the context of the approach-
ing winter. In parallel, the government is 
trying to compensate citizens for price 
rises; particularly pensioners, employees in the budget sector, and workers in large plants. 
This is also very important for preserving peace in society. 
Minsk’s foreign policy crisis
When Alexander Lukashenko announced at the end of August this year that he intended to 
hold round table talks with his political opponents and to release the majority of political 
prisoners, it was interpreted as an attempt to re-open dialogue with the West. This dialogue 
was broken off following the pacification of the demonstration held on 19 December 2010 
in the centre of Minsk following the election. It seemed then that the regime wanted to 
resume its former tactic of vacillating between Russia and the West, which for the last sev-
eral years had made Belarusian foreign policy so effective. However, Alexander Lukashenko 
rapidly withdrew from his declarations and called upon the Belarusian delegation to boycott 
the Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw, held on 29–30 September this year. On that 
occasion he accused the EU of applying double standards and even reproached Poland, 
which is currently holding the EU presidency, for its alleged intention to annex the western 
part of Belarus. 
Lukashenko thus made clear his dissatisfaction with Brussels’ unconstructive – in his opin-
ion – position as it makes co-operation with the Belarusian regime dependent on the respect 
for human rights. This means the lack of preparedness for fulfilling the EU’s prerequisites, 
including the release and full rehabilitation of all political prisoners.  
In response to Lukashenko’s stance on 10 October, the EU foreign ministers made a deci-
sion to prolong the visa sanctions (introduced at the beginning of the year) against repre-
sentatives of the regime until 31 October 2012. They also decided to add 16 names to the 
list of the people banned from the entry to the EU; the list now features over 200 names. 
The result of the policy pursued by Lukashenko is the entrenchment of Belarus’s self-
imposed isolation, which translates into it having a weaker negotiating position in talks with 
Russia. This makes it easier for Moscow to realise its interests in relations with Belarus, 
of which the most important is the takeover of key assets in Belarusian heavy industry. 
The government aims to intimidate 
and paralyse the social groups which 
are the most active and critical of the 
regime. In parallel, the government is 
trying to compensate citizens for price 
rises. This is also very important for 
preserving peace in society. 
i s s u e  6 6  |  2 8 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 5
As a result, Minsk, almost entirely deprived of assets, is beginning to buckle under pressure 
from Moscow. Long negotiations on the sale of 50% of the remaining shares of Beltransgaz, 
the owner of the Belarusian system of gas pipelines, to Gazprom are drawing to a close. 
The other half of these shares is already held by Russians. Moscow is making discounts on 
gas supplies it can grant to Belarus in the following year dependent on this transaction with 
Gazprom. According to official communiqués made by both parties, the final agreement 
and a new gas contract will be signed in November this year. On 11 October the framework 
agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus by the Russian com-
pany Atomstroyexport was concluded between Russia and Belarus. Although the project 
is at present far from being implemented, this agreement is a concession made by Minsk 
to Russia. It confirms that Russia is an exclusive partner in the construction of such facili-
ties in Belarus and thus further strength-
ens its dependence on Russian supplies 
of energy and resources. By accepting 
this scenario the Belarusian government is 
expecting to obtain lower prices for Rus-
sian gas, which is of key importance to its 
energy-consuming industry. 
Alexander Lukashenko’s rhetoric towards 
Russia has also considerably changed. 
Earlier very critical of the Kremlin’s ac-
tions, in a large article published in the 
Russian Izvestia on 17 October he eagerly 
endorsed the project of close integration 
for post-Soviet states within the Eurasian Union, presented by Vladimir Putin at the beginning 
of October. At the same time the Lukashenko pointed to the necessity of respecting the rights 
of all the countries involved in Russian integration projects, including their equal access to 
the markets and networks of pipelines. It cannot be ruled out that this statement also con-
tained a veiled attempt to blackmail the West with the prospect of the threat to Belarus’s sov-
ereignty posed by Russia. In parallel to these actions Minsk is trying to extend co-operation 
with countries outside Europe. However, so far formal declarations and commitments have 
been clearly dominating tangible gains. This situation is well illustrated by Belarus’s relations 
with China – although Lukashenko describes it as a strategic partner, China clearly does not 
want to play this role and has opted to focus on specific investment projects with conditions 
which are not always favourable to Belarus. This avenue can thus be seen as more comple-
mentary to than as an alternative to relations with Russia or the EU. 
Conclusions 
1. Alexander Lukashenko, fearing the weakening or loss of his power, is evading necessary 
economic reforms recommended by many experts. He is thus preserving an ineffec-
tive, anarchistic command-and-quota model, which is in his opinion the safest solution. 
The anti-crisis measures undertaken by the government are short-term and too limited 
in order to lead to a real improvement in the situation. Many signs reveal that the crisis 
on the Belarusian economy will intensify, even more so as the government is not aban-
doning its costly social policy. By rejecting the possibility of a political and economic 
transformation Alexander Lukashenko is tightening control over society and is trying to 
intimidate its most active section. 
The result of the policy pursued 
by Lukashenko is the entrenchment 
of Belarus’s self-imposed isolation, 
which translates into it having 
a weaker negotiating position in talks 
with Russia. This makes it easier for 
Moscow to realise its interests in rela-
tions with Belarus, of which the most 
important is the takeover of key assets 
in the Belarusian heavy industry. 
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2. At the same time Minsk has lost the room for manoeuvre in its foreign policy. Alexander 
Lukashenko is not able to return to the tactic he has used for many years of vacillat-
ing between the West and Russia. Poor relations with the EU and the US reinforce the 
regime’s self-imposed isolation in the international arena. This narrows down Belarus’s 
freedom of political manoeuvre; furthermore, it makes it very difficult to obtain stabilisa-
tion loans from international financial institutions, particularly from the IMF. With regard 
to this, Russia can be more effective in forcing Belarus to make concessions in areas 
which are important to Russia, such as for example the sale of shares in strategic com-
panies.
3. With regard to the above, everything points to the fact that the regime is already strug-
gling not only with a severe economic crisis but also with a conceptual crisis and is no 
longer able to produce a long-term strategy adequate to the scale of current threats. 
As a result of this, Alexander Lukashenko will be forced in the short term to make con-
cessions to Russia, which will gradually restrict his independence. On the other hand, 
it will allow him to delay the danger of an uncontrollable social revolt.
